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AZEVEDO v. ABEL: DENIAL OF EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO
SUE HIS EMPLOYER FOR AN INTENTIONAL TORT
In the recent case of Azevedo v. Abel,1 the California Court of
Appeal held that an employee who suffers a work-connected assault at
the hands of his employer cannot seek damages in an action at law.
He has as his only remedy the right to file for compensation before
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.2 This holding, which
places California in the minority on this question, settles a point of law
that has been in doubt for some time in this state.
The Development of the California Rule: A Short Analysis
The first California case to rule on the issue of an employer's
intentional tort upon his employee was Conway v. GlobinY In that
case the court held that the plaintiff-employee had the right to maintain
a common law tort action against the defendant-employer. Although
it noted in passing that most jurisdictions offer an employee who is the
victim of his employer's intentional tort a choice of remedies, workmen's
compensation or a tort action, the court decided that an intentional tort
could not arise out of and in the course of employment:
[We cannot] say that an intentional assault by the employer is a
risk or condition incident to the employment. To so hold would be
not only to sanction indirectly conduct of the employer which is
both tortious and criminal, but also would be to permit the em-
ployer to use the Workmen's Compensation Act to shield him from
his larger civil liability. .... 4
The question of an employer's battery of an employee next arose
in Carter v. Superior Court.5 This case, however, served only to con-
1. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
2. The Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board "shall exercise all judicial
powers vested in it under this code." CAL. LABoR CODE § 111. The Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeals Board's most important function is to hear and decide industrial in-
jury cases. The appeals board is made up of seven members, headed by a chairman.
Under normal circumstances, the chairman will assign cases to three members for
hearing and decision. The decision of these three-member committees is the decision
of the appeals board.
Before 1965, the powers of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board were
exercised by the Industrial Accident Commission. Both terms will be found in this
paper and should be considered interchangeable. See B. WIxn, StmmRY oF CAL-
iFORNI LAW § 5C, at 639 (Supp. 1967).
3. 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951).
4. Id. at 498, 233 P.2d at 614.
5. 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598 (1956).
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fuse California's position on the issue. The plaintiff, Greenwood, an
employee of the defendant, Carter, was beaten by one of the latter's
agents. Greenwood filed with the Industrial Accident Commission6 for
a hearing to obtain compensation and, three months later, accepted a
compromise settlement of $850, which settlement the commission ap-
proved.
7
The matter did not end there. Several weeks before Greenwood
had compromised with his employer, he brought an action in tort in
superior court, asking for compensatory and punitive damages. The
defendant prayed that a writ of prohibition or mandamus be issued to
restrain the court from proceeding with the suit.8 The California Court
of Appeal, in issuing a writ of mandate, proceeded to define the rights
of an assaulted employee. Citing Conway as its authority, the court
said:
It is now settled in this state that an employee who sustains an
injury which is intentionally inflicted by his employer is not rele-
gated to a claim for compensation before the Industrial Accident
Commission, but may treat his injury as not having arisen out of
and in the course of his employment; and he may, therefore,
maintain an action at law to recover damages both compensatory
and exemplary. . . 9
Thus far, Carter, inasmuch as it permits the assaulted employee to main-
tain a civil action for damages, is consistent with the Conway decision.
At this point, however, the Carter court took a statement from
Conway out of context. It referred to a statement in that decision
which pointed out that most jurisdictions allow the battered employee
an election, either to sue for damages or to apply for benefits under the
workmen's compensation statutes. ° The Carter court apparently be-
lieved that this statement, although dictum, was considered by the
court in Conway to be the law in California. 1' A reading of Conway,
however, will show that the statement was made only to contrast the
weight of authority with the California rule, which was enunciated in
the concluding paragraphs of the opinion.' 2 There is no statement in
Conway which suggests that the employee in California should have
the right to elect his remedy; it is difficult to understand how the
court in Carter arrived at the conclusion that there was such an asser-
tion in the earlier opinion.
6. Id. at 353, 298 P.2d at 599.
7. Id. at 353, 298 P.2d at 600.
8. Id. at 354, 298 P.2d at 600.
9. Id.
10. Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 497, 233 P.2d 612, 614 (1951).
11. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 354-55, 298 P.2d 598, 600-01
(1956).
12. Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 498, 233 P.2d 612, 614 (1951).
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Carter went on to say that an employee who suffers a work-related
assault inflicted by his employer has a choice of remedies. He could
claim that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and
seek compensation before the Industrial Accident Commission, or he
could allege that his injury was not work-connected and bring an action
at law. In neither case would the employer be allowed to dispute the
theory behind the employee's cause of action. If, for example, the
workman alleged that the injury was not related to his employment
so that he might bring an action at law, the employer could not defeat
the court's jurisdiction by claiming that the injury arose out of the
employment. 13
The Carter court, then, gave the battered employee the right to
elect his remedy. Or did it give him that right? The above discussion
seems to indicate that it did, and the decision has been cited by at least
one authority 4 as holding that it allows an election, but a careful read-
ing of the opinion reveals that it does not.
The court went on to declare that the employee cannot collect both
compensation and damages. If he establishes that the injury was re-
lated to his job, then only the Industrial Accident Commission has
jurisdiction to grant him relief; if, on the other hand, the employee
shows that his injury did not arise out of his employment, then his sole
remedy is an action at law.'5
The court pointed out that the mere filing of a claim for compen-
sation with the Industrial Accident Commission does not bar the sub-
sequent filing of an action at law:
13. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 355, 298 P.2d 598, 601
(1956).
14. 2 B. Wrmnm, SuMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 12, at 1660-61 (7th ed. 1960).
But cf. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 22.03(3) (2d ed. 1968). The author's discussion indicates the con-
fusion produced by Carter. He begins by declaring that "an employee may assert that
the injury occurred by reason of a risk or condition incident to the employment,
notwithstanding the fact that it was intentional, and seek compensation before the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board; or, he may treat his injury as not having
arisen out of and in the course of employment and seek damages in an action at law."
Id. Although this would suggest that the employee can elect his remedy, the author goes
on to state that jurisdiction is not concurrent "since if the act is established to be fairly
traceable to an incident of the employment, then only the Appeals Board has jurisdic-
tion and the compensation remedy is exclusive, while if the act is established to be the
result of personal grievances unconnected with employment, then only the courts have
jurisdiction." Id. Thus Hanna now says that the facts, not the employee's allegations,
determine which forum has jurisdiction. If the facts are controlling on the question of
jurisdiction, then there is, of course, no right of election given to the employee. For a
definition of election of remedies see text accompanying note 17 infra.
15. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 355-56, 298 P.2d 598, 601
(1956).
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Undoubtedly an injured employee who is in doubt as to whether
his cause of action is one for compensation or one for damages,
and therefore in doubt as to which tribunal . . .has jurisdiction
over his cause of action, may submit this question to either tri-
bunal. If the tribunal to which he submits it holds that it does
not have jurisdiction, then he is free to proceed before the other
tribunal; but if [the initial tribunal] rules that it does have juris-
diction, then it and it only can proceed . . . [but] there is nothing
to preclude the filing of a claim before a second tribunal while
the question of jurisdiction yet remains undetermined in the tri-
bunal whose jurisdiction is first invoked and which alone has the
right to proceed .... 16
What is described in the above quotation is not an election of
remedies in the traditional sense. "In its conventional form, the doctrine
is stated as follows: Where a person has two concurrent remedies to
obtain relief on the same state of facts, and these remedies are incon-
sistent, he must choose or elect between them . ... 17 In light of
this definition, it is evident that the court was not giving the employee
who is assaulted by his employer an election of remedies. If that
right had been given, then neither the Industrial Accident Commission
nor the courts would have had to determine jurisdiction. That is, if
the employee could truly elect between damages at law and workmen's
compensation benefits, then the court (or the commission) would have
to accept the election. But the Carter decision said that whether an
assault arose out of and in the course of employment was a question of
fact to be determined either by the courts or by the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission. 8 The tribunal, not the plaintiff, would then decide
which remedy was available. The only choice given the employee is
the selection of the forum that will determine his rights.
The Carter court, then, gave not the right to elect the remedy,
but the right to select the initial forum. Moreover, the court attempted
to establish a procedure like the one outlined in Scott v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission.} The Scott case held that where two tribunals both
16. Id. at 356, 298 P.2d at 601.
17. 1 B. WIMrrN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 46, at 542 (1954). The New York
courts apparently have a better understanding of how this doctrine is to be applied to an
employer's battery. "That remedy [Workmen's Compensation] was predicated upon
the theory that [the employee's] injury was 'accidental' within the statutory definition.
His common law action negates the theory of 'accidental injury.' He bases his cause
of action upon a willful and wanton assault by his employers and on the theory that
such assault is not an accidental injury under the statute. Assuming that he had two
remedies . . .it must be held that the two are inconsistent one with the other. He
may not pursue both to a conclusion." Legault v. Brown, 283 App. Div. 303, 306, 127
N.Y.S.2d 601, 604 (1954).
18. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356, 298 P.2d 598, 601
(1956).
19. 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956).
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have the right to determine jurisdiction, the question of which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction shall be decided by the tribunal whose juris-
diction was first invoked; any proceedings that are subsequently ini-
tiated in another tribunal would be restrained.20  Thus, Carter applied
the procedural rules set out in Scott to a factual situation involving an
intentional tort.
Although the Carter opinion is somewhat unclear on the question
of election of remedies, it did clearly establish the employee's right to
obtain workmen's compensation benefits for injuries caused by an
employer's assault:
The question of whether or not an injury is one which arises out of
the employment, and is therefore one which is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission, is a question of
fact. Greenwood, by filing his application with the commission
...submitted this question of fact to the commission. In acting
upon this application and approving the agreement for compromise
and release, the commission impliedly and necessarily found that
the injury did arise out of the employment, for otherwise it could
not have found that it had jurisdiction to make its award .... 21
Therefore, the Carter decision in effect reversed the holding of Conway
v. Globin that an employer's intentional tort could not, as a matter of
law, arise out of and in the course of the employee's employment.
Under the Carter rule, it was a question of fact to be decided either by
the Industrial Accident Commission or the courts.
The California appellate courts were next asked to pass on the
problem of an employer's assault in Azevedo v. Industrial Accident
Commission.22 The plaintiff worked as a saleslady in the defendant's
dress shop. When she told the defendant of a telephone conversation
which she had with a dissatisfied customer, he became angry and
struck her with his knee in her sacro-coccyx area.2 3 The plaintiff filed
an application for workmen's compensation benefits with the Industrial
Accident Commission. The commission, which had apparently never
heard of the Carter decision, or else decided to ignore it, concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction.24 The plaintiff appealed to the court of appeal,
which defined the issue before it for consideration: "[D]oes the com-
mission have jurisdiction to award compensation for an injury inflicted
by an employer upon an employee if the commission finds that the
20. Id. at 88-89, 293 P.2d at 25. See also Taylor v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d
148, 301 P.2d 866 (1956).
21. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356, 298 P.2d 598, 601-02
(1956). Because that determination was final, it was binding on all other state
tribunals. Consequently, the court of appeal held that under the doctrine of res
judicata, the court in which Greenwood filed his civil action could not proceed.
22. 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 52 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1966).
23. Id. at 372, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
24. Id. at 372, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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injury was incurred within the course of employment?"25  The court
held that it did.
The court discussed Conway and Carter and found the former's
reasoning "imperfect." A key passage26 of Conway, which advanced
policy reasons for denying the employee workmen's compensation bene-
fits, was quoted2 7 and attacked on several grounds: (1) Although the
workmen's compensation statute confers immunity from a civil action to
an employer who commits a work-connected assault, he is not immune
from a criminal prosecution; 2s (2) by filing for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, the employee is immune from most of the defenses avail-
able to a defendant in a tort action;29 (3) section 4553 of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code penalizes the employer for "serious and willful mis-
conduct" to the extent of 50 percent of the compensation otherwise re-
coverable by the employee;30 (4) the workmen's compensation law
protects the employee from his employer's insolvency by provision for
compulsory insurance; 31 (5) the injured employee receives prompt and
25. Id. at 371, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
26. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
27. Azevedo v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 373, 52 Cal. Rptr.
283, 285 (1966).
28. Id.
29. Id. The court relies on State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n
(Hull), 38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952), to support this statement. In Hull, an
employee who attacked a co-employee and who was injured in the struggle was never-
theless able to collect compensation. But section 3600(g) of the California Labor
Code now overrules the Hull decision Neither Hull nor section 3600(g), however, is
really relevant to this discussion.
30. Azevedo v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 286 (1966). The statute provides: "The amount of compensation other-
wise recoverable shall be increased one-half where the employee is injured by reason
of the serious and willful misconduct of any of the following:
"(a) The employer, or his managing representative.
"(b) If the employer is a partnership, on the part of one of the partners or a
managing representative or general superintendent thereof.
"(c) If the employer is a corporation, on the part of an executive, managing
officer, or general superintendent thereof.
"But such increase of award shall in no event exceed seven thousand five hundred
dollars ($7,500); together with costs and expenses incident to procurement of such
award, not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250)." CAL. LABOR CODE § 4553.
31. Azevedo v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 286 (1966). CAL. LABOR CODE § 3700 provides: "Every employer .
shall secure the payment of compensation in one or more of the following ways:
"(a) By being insured against liability to pay compensation in one or more in-
surers duly authorized to write compensation insurance in this State."
The court also observed that insurance was a benefit denied in a common law
action since insurance against intentional torts is unlawful as against public policy.
243 Cal. App. 2d at 374, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 286. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1668 provides:
"All contracts which have for their object . . . to exempt any one from responsibility
for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another. . . are against
the policy of the law."
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comprehensive care. 2
The court then went on to expressly overrule the Conway holding.
The court referred to section 21 of article 20 of the California Constitu-
tion33 and to sections 360034 and 45535 of the Labor Code and con-
cluded that the net effect of these provisions was to confer on the Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board jurisdiction over employers' inten-
tional torts that arise out of the employee's work.86  The court de-
clared:
We hold that the intentional assault committed by an employer
upon his employee under the circumstances here-being an act
"fairly traceable to an incident of the employment" and not "the
result of personal grievances unconnected with the employment" is
within the jurisdiction of the commission where, as here, that juris-
diction is first sought and enlisted by the injured employee.3 7
The court, however, refused to pass on the issue of whether an
employee has an election of remedies. Admitting that the "questions
of whether the commission's jurisdiction is exclusive or whether su-
perior court jurisdiction is in addition or an alternative to jurisdiction of
the commission present many problems," 38 the court decided to avoid
these problems and followed only that part of Carter which held that
32. Azevedo v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 286 (1966). CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600: "Medical, surgical, and hospital
treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and surgical supplies, crutches, and
apparatus, including artificial members, which is reasonably required to cure or relieve
from the effects of the injury shall be provided by the employer."
33. "The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power . . to create
and enforce a complete system of workmen's compensation, by appropriate legislation,
and in that behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to
compensate any or all of their workmen for injury or disability, and their dependents
for death incurred or sustained by the said workmen in the course of their employment,
irrespective of the fault of any party." CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 21.
34. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600: "Liability for the compensation provided by this
division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person ... shall, without
regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees
arising out of and in the course of the employment. .. .
35. See note 30 supra.
36. Azevedo v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374-75, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 286-87 (1966). The main points of the court's argument are that (1) the
California Constitution provides compensation to workmen regardless of the fault of
any party; (2) compensation is given for an "injury," not an "accident." Id. at
374-75, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 286. Therefore, no matter who is at fault, if the employee
suffers a work-connected injury, he can be compensated. As will be seen later, some
jurisdictions circumvent their workmen's compensation statutes by defining "accident"
in such a way that intentional torts are excluded. See text accompanying notes 50-53
infra. Obviously, no California court could employ that line of reasoning, as this state
does not use "accident" in its codes.
37. Azevedo v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 376-77, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 273, 287-88 (1966).
38. Id. at 373 n.1, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 285 n.1.
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work-connected assaults by employers upon employees are within the
commission's jurisdiction.39
The issue of election of remedies, raised by Carter and avoided by
Azevedo v. Industrial Accident Commission, was settled by Azevedo v.
Abel.4" After the first Azevedo decision, the Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board heard the employee's case and awarded her compensa-
tion. Before the award was made, however, the plaintiff had filed an
action at law for damages. The court dismissed the action on the
ground that the plaintiff's sole remedy was the compensation granted
to her by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. The plaintiff
appealed from the dismissal and the defendant's insurer appealed from
the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. The
cases were consolidated for decision on appeal.4
After holding that the insurance carrier was liable for the "em-
ployer's ordinary liability for disability compensation and medical ex-
pense, even when occasioned by his willful wrong," 2 the court of appeal
next considered the plaintiff's contention that she had the right to elect
her remedy. It decided that her only remedy was her right to work-
men's compensation benefits:
A damage suit as an alternative or additional source of compensa-
tion, becomes permissible only by carving a judicial exception in
an uncarved statute. Whatever the question of judicial power, the
ad hoc theories devised to avoid the statute possess shallow appeal.
Resort to a fictitious theory of noncompensability relegates the
employee to the dubious benefit of a lawsuit he may lose. The
theory which poses a civil action as a sanction against deliberate
torts is enfeebled by the compensation law's penalty for serious and
willful misconduct. Neither moral aversion to the employer's act
nor the shiny prospect of a large damage verdict justifies inter-
ference with what is essentially a policy choice of the Legislature.
The policy choice is to provide employees economic insurance
against disability in exchange for the speculative possibility of
general damages; to offer the augmented award for serious and
wilful misconduct in trade for the relatively rare award of punitive
damages.
43
California law is now settled on the question of an employer's lia-
bility for the assaults he commits upon his employees. If the tort arises
out of and in the course of employment, then the Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board has exclusive jurisdiction. If the tort is the result
of personal grievances, then the master-servant relation is irrelevant
and the matter is adjudicated in an action at law." But is substantial
39. Id.
40. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
41. Id. at 453, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
42. Id. at 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
43. Id. at 459-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
44. See text accompanying notes 22-43 supra.
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justice achieved under this rule? Does it really make any difference
that an employee who suffers a work-connected assault at the hands
of his employer cannot bring an action at law for damages? In con-
sidering this problem it is useful to see how other jurisdictions have
approached the problem.
The Other Jurisdictions: No Immunity from a Tort Suit
Most courts have taken the moralistic position that an employer
should be punished for his sins in a civil action and have offered various
reasons, many of them flawed, to justify their stands.4 5 In the leading
case of Boek v. Wong Hing,48 the Minnesota Supreme Court declared
that "[b]y committing a felonious assault upon a servant the master
willfully severs the relation of master and servant and should be held
to have left it to the election of the servant either to consider the re-
lation still existing and seek redress through the Compensation Act, or
else to consider the relation terminated and seek redress under the
common law.
'47
There are two problems with this theory. First, it is doubtful that
the employer intends to "sever" the relation of master and servant even
when he strikes his employee. The dubiousness of the theory is high-
lighted when, as sometimes happens, the employee continues on the
job after the commission of the tort.4  Second, since there are instances
where it is beyond doubt that the employment relationship produced
the motivation for the commission of the tort,49 it is to indulge in a
fiction to allow the employee "to consider the relationship terminated."
The New York courts, by defining "accident" to exclude intentional
injuries,5" have taken the position that the employee may maintain an
action at law. In Antonio v. Hirsch,51 the court said that the "Work-
men's Compensation Law deals with and has application to accidental
45. For a small sampling of the kind of rhetoric employed, see Page, The
Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to Sue
in Tort, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 555, 560 (1962).
46. 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); accord, Heskett v. Fisher Laundry &
Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950). Contra, W.B. Davis & Son v.
Ruple, 222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772 (1930) (dictum); Beck v. Hamann, 263 Wis. 131, 56
N.W.2d 837 (1953) (dictum).
47. Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471-72, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930).
48. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 68.11 (1968) [herein-
after cited as LARSON].
49. E.g., Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
50. "'Accidental' is said to be that which happens without design or expecta-
tion ....
... where the injury was not designed nor the danger known." Le Pochat v.
Pendelton, 187 Misc. 296, 298, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
51. 4 Misc. 2d 42, 157 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd, 3 App. Div. 2d
939, 163 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1957).
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injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and not to an
intentional act by an employer, which act causes a serious injury to an
employee. '52  Seven years earlier, the appellate division of the su-
preme court had taken the same position:
We entertain not the slightest doubt that where an employer.
is guilty of a felonious assault upon an employee he cannot relegate
the latter to the compensation statutes as the sole remedy for his
tortious act. It would be abhorrent to our sense of justice to hold
that an employer may assault his employee and then compel the
injured workman to accept the meager allowance provided by the
Workmen's Compensation Law.53
Some courts resort to the argument relied on in Conway v. Globin
-an assault can never arise out of the employment. In one decision,
the court somewhat indignantly said that it could not "accept the full
implication of the defendant's argument-that to be imprisoned and
beaten by company guards is a hazard of employment in Illinois."5
The Texas courts have been able to avoid the workmen's compen-
sation provisions by construing the applicable statutes to include only
accidents and by declaring that the Texas Bill of Rights prohibits the
legislature from denying an employee the right to bring a civil action.
In Middleton v. Power and Light Co.," the court had this to say:
The Bill of Rights, section 13, article 1 of the Constitution, pro-
vides that "every person for any injury done him, in his lands, good,
person or reputation, shall have his remedy by due course of law;"
that is, the right of redress in the courts of the land in accordance
with the law's administration. It is, therefore, not to be doubted
that the Legislature is without the power to deny the citizen the
right to resort to the courts for the redress of any intentional
injury to his person by another.56
There is, however, a fatal flaw in the court's argument. It would
52. Id. at 43, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
53. Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 693-94, 87
N.Y.S.2d 90, 93-94 (1949). Other courts have circumvented the workmen's compensa-
tion acts of their respective states through the construction of the word "accident." In
Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35, the court observed: "To
say that an intentional and malicious assault and battery by an employer on an em-
ployee is . . . an accident is a travesty on the use of the English language . . . ." Id.
at 55, 9 S.E.2d at 37. A Pennsylvania Superior Court defined "accident" as an
"undesigned event" and concluded that there could be no recovery under workmen's
compensation where the injury is not the result of such an accident-thus excluding
intentional torts. Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 134, 138, 191 A.2d 694,
697 (1963).
54. Barnes v. Chrysler Corp., 65 F. Supp. 806, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1946); accord,
Rumbolo v. Erb, 19 N.J. Misc. 311, 20 A.2d 54 (C.P. 1941).
55. 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916); accord, Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141, 144 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926) (dictum).




seem that since the controlling phrase in the quotation from the Texas
Bill of Rights is "any injury," the legislature would also be without
power to deny a cause of action to the victim of a negligent tort.
Nevertheless, the court maintained that the legislature, by passing a
workmen's compensation statute, could abrogate a cause of action for
accidental injury. Clearly, the court cannot have it both ways.
A few courts are forced to employ bizarre reasoning to give a
battered employee the right to maintain a civil suit for a work-related
intentional tort. In Rumbolo v. Erb,5 for example, the New Jersey
Court of Common Pleas decided that the Compensation Court had no
jurisdiction over intentional torts on the ground that the defendant
should have the right to counter-claim. "Such cases (as this one)
usually involve mutual charges of assault and countersuits and counter-
claims and there are, of course, no provisions in the Compensation Act
for counterclaims or set-offs by the employer . . . ,,.s Thus if the
Compensation Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim, the em-
ployer would be left with no remedy for a claim that the workman
assaulted him. 9
Finally, some states have approached the problem through legis-
lation. The statutes may be placed in three main categories. A
number of jurisdictions simply allow the employee to maintain a tort
action. 0  Two jurisdictions-California6' and Massachusetts 6 -- add
to the workmen's compensation benefits a penalty assessment of 50
percent and 100 percent, respectively. Three other states-Oregon, 3
Washington, 4 and West Virginia 6 -- permit the injured workman to
collect compensation and bring an action at law for damages over
the amount payable under the workmen's compensation statutes. This
is probably the most equitable system employed, as far as the employee
is concerned, because he is not forced to surrender one remedy to gain
another.66 As the Oregon Supreme Court in Weis v. Allen stated:
"Instead of compelling the injured workman to elect at his peril which
course to pursue, [the Workmen's Compensation Act] assures him at
least the compensation which he would be entitled to receive in any
event for the injuries suffered and in addition grants him the right to
57. 19 N.J. Misc. 311, 20 A.2d 54 (C.P. 1941).
58. Id. at 312, 20 A.2d at 54.
59. Id.
60. Kentucky, Maryland, and Utah have statutory provisions allowing a civil
action. See 3 LARSON App. A, Table 4, at 516 (1968).
61. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4553.
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (1965).
63. ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1957).
64. WASH. REV. CODE 51.24.020 (1962).
65. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1966).
66. See text accompanying notes 87-104 infra.
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avail himself of his common law remedy. 67
Misrepresentation: A Short Digression
This paper heretofore has been concerned with the physical torts
of assault and battery, but it is impossible to present a full discussion
of employers' intentional torts and the problems they present without
considering misrepresentation. In most of the factual situations involv-
ing this tort, the employer deceitfully tries to deprive the injured em-
ployee of his rights under the workmen's compensation acts or at com-
mon law.6 In Flamm v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,69 a workman who had
been injured in an accident alleged that his employer and the examining
physician conspired to mislead the Deputy Commissioner of Compensa-
tion, thereby causing the plaintiff to be denied further compensation.
The court held that he had the right to sue in tort because his injury was
not covered by the Federal Compensation Act:
The plaintiff does not sue for the tort which occurred in 1950 [the
original accident] and which came within the purview of the Federal
Compensation Act. He sues for the wrong which was inflicted
upon him in 1952 "for the deprivation of the statutory right by a
fradulent device."'70
Although there are still a few decisions that deny the worker the
right to maintain an action for misrepresentation,' 1 most courts allow
it,72 pointing out that the cause of action arises "not on account of the
original negligence but on account of the subsequent wrongdoing
"73
In California, although the courts apparently will not allow a
tort suit when the employer's misrepresentation causes the employee
to injure himself physically, 74 an action at law can be brought for the
employer's extrinsic fraud which conceals from the injured workman
any of his possible remedies. In Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp.,75
the plaintiff alleged that he was employed by General Petroleum, and
was injured in a drilling operation because of the negligence of an em-
67. 147 Ore. 670, 683, 35 P.2d 478, 483 (1937).
68. See, e.g., Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Corp., 112 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.
1940).
69. 18 Misc. 2d 154, 185 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
70. Id. at 156, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
71. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Watson, 201 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Ark. 1962); Bevis
v. Armco Steel Corp., 86 Ohio App. 525, 93 N.E.2d 33 (1949).
72. See, e.g., Powers v. Middleboro Hosp., 258 Ky. 20, 79 S.W.2d 391 (1935);
Rocanti v. Black Diamond Stevedoring Co., 132 N.J.L. 250, 39 A.2d 91 (1944)
(dictum).
73. Clark v. Amos, 144 Kan. 115, 116, 58 P.2d 81, 82 (1936) (dictum).
74. See Buttner v. American Bell Tel. Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439
(1940).
75. 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d 787 (1959).
[Vol. 21
February 1970] INTENTIONAL TORTS
ployee of Pacific, which had joined General Petroleum in the operation.
The plaintiff claimed that his employer conspired with Pacific to conceal
the facts of his cause of action against that third party (and Pacific)
by falsely representing that his sole remedy was under workmen's
compensation. Five years after the accident, the plaintiff brought a civil
action, joining General Petroleum and Pacific in the suit."6 Refusing
to recognize the defense that workmen's compensation was the plaintiffs
exclusive remedy, the California Court of Appeal said:
Surely, the Legislature never intended that an employer's
fraud was a risk of employment. Further, we do not believe that
an injury caused by the employer's fraud arises out of the employ-
ment nor is it proximately caused by the employment as those
terms are used in the statute.77
Two observations can be made about the California rule on em-
ployer's extrinsic fraud. First, it is entirely consistent with the second
Azevedo holding. If the intentional tort is work-connected, then the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board has exclusive jurisdiction; if
it does not arise out of the employment, the plaintiff must maintain a
civil action. Thus, if a factual situation like that in Ramey should ever
come before it again, a California court could allow a civil suit without
departing from Azevedo.
Second, it is apparent that when California and the other juris-
dictions allow an action in tort on the ground that the fraud is not work-
related, they are not resorting to a fiction such as the one described
earlier.78 It would be difficult to believe that one of the risks of em-
ployment is the possibility that an employer will mislead his employee
about his remedies if the latter is injured.
California Law: Proposal for a New Departure
This paper has attempted to survey the present state of the law
regarding employers' intentional torts upon employees. Consideration
will now be given to improvements that should be made in the Cali-
fornia law. It is beyond question that the employee should have
the right to apply for workmen's compensation benefits. As pointed
out in the first Azevedo case, the employee receives prompt medical
attention and the employer's insurance guarantees that the employee will
be able to collect his award. 9 Furthermore, the workman is more
certain to be awarded compensation than he is to win an action at law.
For two reasons, however, the battered employee should also be
able to bring an action in tort if he decides to do so. First, there is a
76. Id. at 397, 343 P.2d at 793.
77. Id. at 402-03, 343 P.2d at 797.
78. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
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situation in which the denial of the right to sue in tort could work a
hardship upon an employee. It is well settled that, to be compensable,
an injury must be disabling."' But what if the employer commits a
work-related intentional tort that is not disabling? The workman can-
not collect workmen's compensation benefits and because that is his
exclusive remedy, he cannot maintain a tort action. Thus, if an em-
ployer slanders an employee, does not batter him seriously enough to
cause a disabling injury, or defames him in front of his co-workers,
then that employee-given that the tort is work-connected-has no
remedy.sl
Second, under the present state of the law, the employee who is
not sure whether the tort arose out of his employment will file for
workmen's compensation benefits and bring an action at law. 2 If the
tribunal whose jurisdiction is first invoked determines that it does not
have jurisdiction, then the employee will have wasted both time and
money paid in attorney's fees. He will then be put to the further in-
convenience and expense of pursuing the remedy available to him in
the alternate forum.
These deficiencies in the California law can be corrected in one
of two ways by legislative action. First, an employee who is the victim
of the employer's work-related intentional tort could be given the right
to elect his remedy. It seems quite clear that the trend in the other
jurisdictions is to allow this right." Thus, the employee could select
his forum and pursue his action to judgment; since the tribunal could
not decline jurisdiction, 4 there would be no waste or duplication of
effort.
A better result, however, would be to afford the employee con-
current remedies. Consider the development of the law with reference
to the rights of an injured employee against a third party tortfeasor. If
a workman, while in the scope of his duties, is negligently or intentionally
injured by a person other than his employer and is not otherwise covered
by the workmen's compensation laws, that workman has a common law
action against the tortfeasor.8 5 Moreover, although some states force
80. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208; see Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
68 Cal. 2d 569, 574, 440 P.2d 236, 239, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (1968) (classification
of injuries).
81. At least one court has realized that if workmen's compensation were his
exclusive right, the employee would be left without a remedy in this situation. See
Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55, 9 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940).
82. See Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356, 298 P.2d 598, 601
(1956). By bringing an action at law and filing for workmen's compensation benefits,
the injured employee will avoid any statute of limitations problems.
83. See text accompanying notes 46-69 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
85. 2 LARSON § 71.00, at 165 (1968).
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the employee to choose one remedy-workmen's compensation bene-
fits or damages-to the exclusion of the other, a majority of the states
allow the injured person to claim compensation and sue for damages
as well. 6
With two exceptions,8 7 all the jurisdictions allowing concurrent
remedies prevent double recovery by requiring the employee to reim-
burse his employer (or the latter's insurer) for any compensation that
he received before obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor8s But
it is important to realize that these states no longer require the em-
ployee "to hazard his substantive rights on an election between claiming
compensation and suing a third party tortfeasor," 89 and it seems to be
the trend to abolish this requirement. 0
In California, an employee's claim for workmen's compensation
benefits does not affect his cause of action for damages against a third
party tortfeasor.Y1 Nor is his right of action barred by an award made
by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board or the payment of the
award by his employer.92 The employer who pays, or becomes obli-
gated to pay compensation may bring a suit in his own name against
the tortfeasor in order to recover the amount of compensation which
he must pay or has already paid to the injured workman.93  He is
entitled to recover his compensation outlays and reasonable attorney's
fees from any judgment he may receive; any excess amount must be
paid to the employee. 4
If either the employee or the employer brings an action against
the third party, the one bringing the action must give written notice
to the other, who may then join as a party plaintiff at any time before
the trial.9 5 If the employer decides to allow his employee to maintain
the suit alone, he can recover his expenditures for compensation by
filing a first lien against the employee's judgment.9
86. Id. § 73.00, at 198.
87. Ohio and West Virginia are the only states that allow a double recovery.
Id. § 71.30, at 168-70.
88. Id. § 73.10, at 198-99. While this is the most popular procedure, a minority
of states employ one of two alternate methods to prevent a double recovery. A few of
these states split the cause of action, allowing the employee to recover damages, less
the amount of compensation he received, and permitting the employer to sue at the same
time for his compensation outlays. A few states permit the employee to prosecute con-
currently both remedies to judgment, but allow him to take only one. Id.
89. Id. § 73.00, at 198.
90. Id.
91. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
92. Housewright v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d 59, 268, 40
Cal. Rptr. 208, 214 (1964).
93. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
94. Id. § 3856(a).
95. Id. § 3853.
96. Id. § 3856(b).
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It should be obvious that the California system is designed to
place the full cost of the injury upon the tortfeasor and provide the
utmost protection for the employee. The latter will be immediately
compensated for his injury and may later collect much more in his tort
action than he received from his employer. The employer, who is not
at fault, is reimbursed for his compensation payments.917  It should also
be noted that the employee is able to obtain benefits at a time of
greatest need-soon after the accident when he must pay for his medical
treatment-without relinquishing his rights against the third party tort-
feasor. 5 The injured workman thus has the best of all possible worlds.
He may accept immediate payments of compensation and still look
forward to collecting substantial damages, less reimbursement to his
employer, after he prosecutes his tort action to judgment.
This system of concurrent remedies could be applied to employ-
er's intentional torts. It is settled in California that an employee who
is the victim of a third party's intentional tort may collect compensa-
tion,99 as well as bring an action at law. Why not expand the system
to allow the employee to collect workmen's compensation for the injury
and later sue the employer in tort for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages? There is at least one practical reason why this modification in the
law should be made. As suggested above, an injured employee is
usually not financially able to forego immediate workmen's compensa-
tion benefits in order to bring a suit for damages later. He is in a
vulnerable position, and must either apply for benefits or accept any
compromise settlement that his employer might offer. But if the em-
ployee is given two concurrent remedies, he can accept workmen's
compensation benefits, which will enable him to pay his medical bills, 100
without giving up his right to a tort action and the possibility of ob-
97. For a good discussion of the equity of this distribution of the cost of the in-
jury, see 2 LARSON § 71.20, at 166-68.
98. Pointing out the unfairness of forcing an injured employee to elect his
remedy at a time when he is badly in need of money, one author asked: "Is it necessary
that the workman by accepting money from the employer or insurer, be it under an
award or without it, forfeit the right to sue the third party for damages? He might be in
urgent need of money. He might still be suffering from the accident. The needs of
his family, which has been deprived of its breadwinner, might weigh heavily on his
mind. He might be unable to pay for hospital and medical help. Does he lose his
right when he accepts money at a time when he is in no financial condition to await
the results of protracted litigation?" Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of
Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12 U. CII. L. REv. 231, 256 (1945).
99. E.g., California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal.
2d 157, 436 P.2d 67, 65 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1968); Western Greyhound Lines v. Indus-
trial Acc. Comm'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 517, 37 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1964).
100. This assumes, of course, that the employee has received a disabling injury.
If the employer's battery has not produced such injury, the employee would have, as
his sole remedy, a tort action.
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taining a large judgment. In other words, the workman would be re-
moved from the precarious position which he now occupies in those
states that force him to choose his remedy. The pressure to accept
immediate, but smaller benefits to the exclusion of eventual, but larger,
damages would thus be removed.
It may be argued that this procedure would continue the ex-
cessive litigation that has been criticized as a fault of the present Califor-
nia system. But by now it should be apparent that there are valid
policy reasons for permitting concurrent actions. The equity of con-
ferring two remedies on the employee is greater than the corresponding
burden placed on the courts.
If this proposal should become the law in California, the burden
of the cost of the injury would theoretically °1 fall upon the proper
party, the employer. The insurance carrier could eventually recover
its compensation outlays to the employee. Most important, the latter
would receive prompt medical treatment while retaining his right to
maintain an action at law. Although this proposal is a departure
from the present law, it is in keeping with the basic policy behind work-
ment's compensation-to provide "in the most efficient, most digni-
fied, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the
victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community
would feel obligated to provide in any case in some less satisfactory
form .... 10 It is submitted that a system of concurrent remedies
is the most satisfactory form.
Ronald E. Niver*
101. In practice, the cost of the injury would be passed on to the consumer. It
may seem unjust to force the user of a product to pay the employer's punitive dam-
ages, but the benefits to the employee more than compensate for this injustice.
102. 1 LARSON § 2.20, at 5.
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